I INTRODUCTION
The accommodation of methods of medical treatment within Australian and United Kingdom ( 'UK') patents law has been controversial since the first patent applications in respect of such methods were filed in the early 20th century. For the last 30 years that controversy has been accepted as having a moral* 1 basis, the issue being whether the public interest in encouraging research and innovation in the medical arena through the provision of patent-related incentives for creators of new and useful therapeutic methods on the one hand is outweighed, on the other, by the various public policy objections to permitting the monopolisation of such methods. Those objections include fears that the monopolisation of medical methods would:
(a) hinder medical research by restricting the free availability of knowledge; (b) be inconsistent with the teaching of medical students and practitioners; (c) expose medical practitioners and patients who use and accept the use of a patented method without a licence to liability for patent infringement; and (d) enable patentees to exact unreasonable payments for life-saving or potentially life-saving techniques.2 The controversy regarding the patentability of methods of medical treatment has not always been understood as an ethical one. Prior to 1971 the inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment was expressly regarded by both Australian and UK decision makers as turning on the essentially black letter law question of the nature of an 'invention', a question that only arose in those jurisdictions after the introduction of modem3 patents legislation.4 Reconception of the issue from 1971 in moral terms can be attributed to a number of possible causes, including the recovery by decision makers from the initial shock caused by the prospect of allowing patents for potentially life-saving treatment, and the general increase in community (and judicial) interest in the morality of science and its implications for patents law. However, it can also be viewed as a recognition by the judiciary of the questions that have always laid at the heart of the issue concerning methods of medical treatment and patents law -namely, whether methods of medical treatment should be patentable and, as a precursor to that question, to what extent (if any) legal constructions of the term 'invention' and patent eligibility generally can legitimately and openly accommodate ethical and other public policy considerations.
There is a great deal of literature concerning the specific public policy arguments for and against the patenting of methods of medical treatment,5 and it is not the purpose of this article to review such arguments nor to argue for their resolution along particular lines. Rather, the purpose of the article is to consider by historical analysis the relationship between decision makers' responses to medical method patents and their conceptions of inherent patentability generally. The thesis advanced in the course of such consideration can be summarised as follows. First, for the last 100 years much of the important jurisprudence relating to inherent patentability in the UK and Australia has derived from cases involving methods of medical treatment. Secondly, those cases are distinguished by the failure of decision makers to resolve convincingly or consistently: (a) the basis for the exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment; and (b) the extent (if any) to which legal constructions of inherent patentability can legitimately accommodate ethical and other (non-commercial) public policy considerations. And thirdly, this failure is largely responsible for the unduly restrictive legal principles that governed inherent patentability in Australia and the UK until 1959 and methods of medical treatment until the 1970s. It is also responsible for the ongoing uncertainty on the part of Australian decision makers concerning the relevance of morality and public policy generally to inherent patentability.
Central to this thesis are the issues noted above concerning what an 'invention' is and whether patents law, in its various 20th century guises, permits decision makers to consider moral issues when determining a subject matter's prima facie eligibility for patent protection. At a time of increasing public and legal debate regarding both the ability of certain new technologies to be treated as inventions and the moral implications of such treatment,6 an historical account of the development of decision makers' responses to these issues has never been more important. That account serves, among other things, as a reminder of the potential consequences for law of dressing public policy decisions in black letter principle, or of otherwise assuming inherent (un)patentability without proper consideration of the foundations for that assumption.
II THE PATENTABILITY OF METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UK TO 1959
Inherent patentability under Australian and UK law has been the subject of legislation since 1623. Analysis of the development of inherent patentability must therefore begin with a description of its contemporary and historical legislative basis.
A Legislative Definitions of Inherent Patentability 1 Australia
Inherent patentability under Australian law depends on the existence of an inherently patentable subject matter or, as such subject matter has traditionally been denoted, on the existence of an 'invention' within the meaning of contemporary patents legislation. The current legislative definition of 'invention' is contained in sch 1 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ('1990 Act') and remains essentially unchanged since the introduction of the first federal Australian patents legislation in 1903.7 Pursuant to that definition, an 'invention' is 'any manner of new manufacture ... within section six of the Statute of Monopolies [including] an alleged invention'.8 Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623 (Eng) ('Statute o f Monopolies')9 in turn provides as follows: P r o v id e d a l s o , a n d b e it d e c la r e d a n d e n a c t e d , th a t a n y d e c la r a t io n , b e f o r em e n t io n e d , s h a ll n o t e x t e n d t o a n y le tte r s p a te n t a n d g r a n ts o f p r i v il e g e fo r t h e te r m o f f o u r t e e n y e a r s , o r u n d e r , h e r e a fte r to b e m a d e , o f t h e s o l e w o r k in g o r m a k in g o f a n y m a n n e r o f n e w m a n u fa c tu r e s w it h in th is r e a lm , to th e tr u e a n d fir s t in v e n t o r a n d in v e n t o r s o f s u c h m a n u fa c tu r e s , w h ic h o th e r s a t th e t im e o f m a k in g s u c h le tte r s p a te n t a n d g r a n ts s h a ll n o t
u s e , s o a s a l s o t h e y b e n o t c o n tr a r y to t h e la w , n o r m i s c h i e v o u s to th e s t a t e , b y r a is in g p r ic e s o f c o m m o d i t ie s a t h o m e , o r h u rt o f tr a d e , o r g e n e r a l l y i n c o n v e n ie n t . T h e s a id f o u r t e e n y e a r s to b e a c c o u n t e d f r o m t h e d a t e o f t h e fir s t le tte r s p a t e n t o f g r a n ts o f s u c h p r i v il e g e h e r e a fte r t o b e m a d e , b u t th a t th e s a m e s h a ll b e o f s u c h f o r c e a s t h e y s h o u ld b e , i f th is a c t h a d n e v e r b e e n m a d e , a n d o f n o n e o th e r .
Thus an invention for the purposes of Australian law is 'any manner of new manufactures ... not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient' within the meaning of the 1623 Statute of Monopolies.10 2 The UK Before the introduction of the current patents legislation in 1977,11 inherent patentability had the same statutory form in the UK as in Australia and thus depended on the existence of a 'manner of new manufacture' within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute o f Monopolies. This common legislative basis makes it appropriate to view the jurisprudence of Australia to date and the UK prior to 1977 as forming one 'Anglo-Australian' jurisprudence; a view that is supported by the historical reliance of Australian decision makers in this area on UK decisions. Despite this, differences in the interpretation of the Statute o f Monopolies and of patentability generally by decision makers in both jurisdictions do exist, and are reflected in the case law involving methods of medical treatment. In the following historical analysis of Anglo-Australian jurisprudence those differences are highlighted as they arise and in so far as they relate to inherent patentability. The effect of the changes to the legislative definition of inherent patentability introduced in the UK in 1977 is also discussed, both for the sake of completeness and as a point of comparison with contemporary Australian law.
Before considering the patentability of medical methods under Anglo-Australian law some description of the legal background to that issue is necessary. This is particularly so given the central thesis of the article regarding the inadequacy of decision makers' responses to medical method patents and its consequences for inherent patentability generally. Hence the purpose of the following section, which is to give an overview of inherent patentability prior to the emergence of medical methods as an issue for Anglo-Australian law in the early 20th century. 
B Inherent Patentability in Anglo-Australian Law Prior to the Emergence of Methods of Medical Treatment as a Patents Law Issue
Before the introduction of the first modem patents legislation in the UK in 1883 there was very little detailed consideration by Anglo-Australian decision makers of the concept or requirements of inherent patentability. This is perhaps not surprising given the general confusion that resulted from the first attempt at such consideration in the late 18th century case of Boulton v Bull,12 and is likely a reflection of the courts' reticence to revisit the issues at the centre of that confusion. Those issues and their resolution in Boulton v Bull are a recurring theme in the 20th century debates concerning inherent patentability generally, and medical methods specifically.
Inherent Patentability Before the Enactment of Modern Patents Legislation: Boulton v Bull and Beyond (a) Background to Boulton v Bull
In 1795 the law of inherent patentability was still in its infancy. Whilst legislation codifying the common law principles of patentability had existed for over 150 years (in the form of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies), for a variety of mainly political reasons the patents system saw little use from the introduction of that legislation in 1623 to the mid-18th century. 13 The result was that in 1795, such principles and the Statute of Monopolies itself had still not received the sustained attention of the courts.14 It is largely for this reason that Boulton v Bull has acquired so much significance, as it is the first case in which inherent patentability under UK law was considered in detail.
(b) The Decision in Boulton v Bull
Boulton v Bull involved a challenge to a patent for a new method of using an old steam engine in a more beneficial way that was described in the specification15 as consisting of certain principles applied in a particular mode to the purposes of the invention.16 The question for the Court was whether the alleged invention so described was a method or principle and, if so, whether this rendered the patent invalid for lack of patentable subject matter. The Judges' decisions differed greatly in method and conception, ultimately producing a split of 2:2 on the question of the patent's validity. The implications of those decisions for inherent patentability can be considered in terms of three related points. The first point concerns methodology. Three of the Judges -Eyre CJ, and Buller and Heath JJ -treated the inherent patentability of the alleged invention as depending upon its classification as a 'manufacture' within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.11 The fourth Judge, Rooke J, also relied on the Statute o f Monopolies but for its 'spirit' and not its concept of manufacture.1 7 18 According to his Honour, the spirit of s 6 supported the patent -there being a new and useful improvement in fire engines sufficiently described in the specification19 -and arguments of invalidity moving from classification of its subject matter as a method or principle not within the scope of 'manufacture' were merely verbal.20 Implicit in this approach was a view of inherent patentability as encompassing any new and useful technological advance adequately represented in the specification.
The second point concerns the widely divergent results of the other three Judges' reliance on the concept of manufacture for the purposes of determining the alleged invention's inherent patentability. According to Heath J, 'manufacture' meant vendible machine or substance,21 with the result that an invention for patentability purposes required a definite physical form.22 Excluding the requirement of vendibility Buller J agreed,23 confirming the restriction of inherent patentability to mechanical and chemical objects.24 This view of the invention was, however, not shared by Eyre CJ, who considered judicial exposition of the Statute o f Monopolies to have bestowed a much wider meaning on 'manufacture' than ordinary language would support.25 Whilst not quite conceding its co-extensiveness with the phrase 'any thing' in s 1 of that statute, the Chief Justice did consider 'manufacture' to be of extensive signification, applying not only to things made but also to practices of making, ways of operating, and principles carried into practice in a new manner or to 
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Ibid 658: Rooke J was inclined to support the patent on the basis o f its conformance to the 'spirit' of the Interestingly, the view o f the invention as requiring some physical form was inconsistent with the nature o f the post-specification invention as an abstract conception and of the pre-specification invention as a working device or trade, which had a tangible existence but (in the case o f trades at least) no necessary physical form (see generally Pila, above n 10). 23
Boulton v Bull (1795) 126 ER 651, 662-3.
24
Note, however, the inconsistency of Justice Buller's conception of the invention as physical object with his statement that additions were inherently patentable provided the relevant patent 'be for the addition only, and not for the old machine too': ibid 664. 25 produce new (including non-physical) results.26 Ultimately for the Chief Justice, an invention for patentability purposes included any specific human action producing effects of use or benefit to the public. This understanding of the invention was sympathetic to the view of inherent patentability supported by Rooke J.
The third point about Boulton v Bull of present relevance concerns the limitations recognised by each Judge as to the scope of inherent patentability. All agreed that principles were inherently unpatentable and, with the exception of Heath J, understood 'principle' in this context to mean an abstract notion27 or elementary truth of the arts and sciences.28 For Heath J principles extended beyond such elementary principles to encompass methods of production, which were therefore also inherently unpatentable in his view.29 Buller J agreed with this conclusion regarding methods of production, but rationalised it by reference to the nature of a method as a 'double use' rather than a principle per se.30 Thus, uses constituted a third category of subject matter identified in Boulton v Bull as inherently unpatentable.
The overall conclusion to be drawn from Boulton v Bull is that in 1795 the common law principles concerning inherent patentability were in a state of confusion. Such confusion centred on two central issues: first, how subject matter for which a patent had been granted was to be construed and defined; and second, how the inherent patentability of subject matter so defined was to be determined. Central to this second issue was the importance of the initial classification of the subject matter itself. In particular, was the inherent patentability of an alleged invention to depend upon its classification as a 'manufacture' and, if so, what did 'manufacture' mean?31 The polarised responses to these issues in Boulton v Bull define to a large extent the post-18th
26
The Chief Justice also noted that a patent for a method involving no new mechanism and producing no new result would necessarily be for the method itself; ie, for the 'method detached from all physical existence whatever': ibid 667. 27 century debates regarding inherent patentability, including those in respect of methods of medical treatment.
Boulton v Bull

(c) Inherent Patentability Post-Boulton v Bull
The innate difficulty of the issues raised in Boulton v Bull is reflected in the case law of the following 100 years. This case law contains virtually no express judicial consideration of inherent patentability,32 reflecting instead a struggle on the part of the courts and other decision makers to understand that concept sufficiently to deal with the individual subject matter before them. Despite this, some conclusions can be drawn from the decisions of this period in relation to the nature and scope of inherent patentability. Principal amongst them is that decision makers overwhelmingly supported the approach of Eyre CJ and Rooke J in Boulton v Bull by acknowledging that any product or method could support a patent, subject only to its inherent ability to satisfy each of the secondary patentability requirements of novelty, utility, and sufficient description in the specification.33 The only subject matter incapable of doing so (and therefore incapable of supporting a patent) were statements of abstract principle having no specified practical utility34 and, for innate lack of novelty (and later inventiveness),35 uses and collocations of known objects, the working or underlying principle of which was identical to that of an existing invention.36 With the exception of these three subject matter,37 no other exclusions from inherent patentability were recognised during the 19th century. In addition, patented inventions during this period were routinely construed in liberal and abstract terms, as practical manifestations of an underlying or working principle, the novelty of which derived either from such principle itself or its particular manifestation.38 It was against the background of this very liberal understanding of inherent patentability that modem patents law and the question regarding the position of medical methods within it emerged.
2 The Modern Law o f Inherent Patentability (a) Legislative Reform As has been noted, the modem era of Anglo-Australian patents law began with the introduction of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883 (UK) ('1883 Act'),39 which was reflected in Australian colonial legislation soon after. The principal significance of that Act for inherent patentability derived from its effect in focusing the attention of decision makers on the literal terms of patents legislation, including s 6 of the Statute o f Monopolies by reference to which inherent patentability was now expressly defined.40 This identification of inherent patentability as a discrete concept and issue was facilitated by the Act's recognition of a distinction between the existence of an invention on the one hand and its novelty on the other.41 An equivalent distinction between an invention and the need for inventiveness and utility was introduced in the second quarter of the 20th century, when each of the threshold and secondary criteria of patent protection was given explicit statutory expression as a ground for opposing a patent application or seeking revocation of a patent grant.42 The of such expression was to require decision makers from the mid 20th century, and earlier in the case of novelty, to treat inherent patentability as a discrete concept independent of inventiveness, utility and novelty in order to distinguish between the various grounds for statutory action.
In addition to the entrenchment by modem patents legislation of the need for an 'invention' as a discrete and threshold requirement of patentability, two other tum-of-the-century developments of significance for inherent patentability should be noted. The first is the centralisation of the patents system in Australia following federation43 and, in particular, the conferral of original jurisdiction in respect of patents matters on the newly established High Court.44 Such conferral created an additional source of patents decisions to supplement those of the UK and Australian Attorneys-and Solicitors-General, the State Supreme Courts and the High Court of England. This development was of particular significance given the seniority of the High Court within Australia's judicial hierarchy compared with that of the UK decision makers having equivalent patents law jurisdiction.
The second significant development around 1900 was a change in the types of technologies for which patents were sought and, in particular, the emergence of a range of new subject matter and their demand for accommodation within traditional patents jurisprudence. Two such subject matter to be considered in the UK and Australia were abstract schemes and methods of facilitating a natural * 5 0 process.45 The early response of decision makers to those subject matter can be viewed in hindsight as precursory to the reception of methods of medical treatment.
(b) Signs of Judicial Reform: The Exclusion from Patentability of Abstract Schemes and Methods of Facilitating a Natural Process The first case to consider in detail the inherent patentability of abstract schemes,46 4 7 and one of the earliest cases to consider in detail the scope of inherent patentability under modem legislation was Re Cooper's Application for a Patent ('Cooper's Application'),*1 decided in 1901. That case involved a patent application in respect of an improved form of newspaper page featuring a blank space along which the page could be folded without disrupting the line of its text.48 Allowing an appeal from a decision of the Comptroller-General, Sir Robert Finlay A-G affirmed the inherent patentability of the subject matter on the ground that it involved 'invention with reference to a manufacture' resulting in a material artificial product.49 The requirement advanced by the AttorneyGeneral for production of a material artificial product was not justified by reference to any authorities and, indeed, was advanced primarily to support the 'tolerably obvious' proposition that '[y]ou cannot have a Patent for a mere scheme or plan'.50 Regardless of the correctness of that proposition itself, the need for a material artificial product had no evident basis in contemporary UK patents law. In addition, it went against the 19th century view of inherent patentability as encompassing any practical manifestation of an idea regardless of physical form, conforming instead to the more restrictive principles of Heath and Buller JJ in Boulton v Bull. The same trend was signaled nine years later in the first reported case to consider the patentability of a method of facilitating a natural process. That case was Rogers v Commonwealth,51 and was a decision of the High Court of Australia.
Rogers v Commonwealth involved an opposition to a patent application in respect of a method of burning timber that involved causing a self feeding slow fire to act continuously against the side of a tree. The main contention of the opponent was that the method was not an invention within the meaning of the statutory definition. That contention was accepted by the two-Judge majority, albeit for different reasons. For Griffiths CJ, the alleged invention was 'a [mere] direction how best to use materials in everyday use to achieve an everyday object'52 equivalent to an inherently unpatentable analogous use. For O'Connor J, in contrast, the alleged invention was unsuited to patent protection because it involved neither the production of any vendible article nor the inventive application of any mechanical contrivance or chemical substance.53 His Honour stated:
T h e p r o p o s it io n [a r tic u la te d b y T in d a l C J in Crane v Price54] th a t a p a te n t m a y b e g r a n te d fo r a n e w m e t h o d o f p r o d u c in g a n o l d r e s u lt in a m o r e e f f i c ie n t a n d m o r e e c o n o m ic a l m a n n e r m u s t b e q u a l if i e d b y t h e c o n d i t i o n th a t the new method must either produce some vendible article or must be carried out by some mechanical contrivance or some substance t h e u s e o r a d a p ta tio n o f w h ic h f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f w o r k in g t h e n e w m e th o d i s p a r t o f t h e i n v e n t io n .55
Whilst not expressly supported by reference to Cooper's Application -or for that matter any other decision -this requirement for the production of a vendible article or use of a mechanical or chemical object was reminiscent of that case with two qualifications. First, the requirement for production of a physical article was expressed by O'Connor J as applying only in respect of methods not involving the use or adaptation of a mechanical contrivance or substance, and was thus not absolute. But second, to the extent that production of a physical article was required the article had to be 'vendible', consistent with the judgment of Heath J in Boulton v Bull.
The ultimate significance of Justice O'Connor's decision lies in its reflection (with Cooper's Application) of an emerging trend during the early 20th century of restrictively interpreting the scope and requirements of inherent patentability in order to exclude subject matter not involving the production or treatment of vendible and/or artificial products. Whilst it is difficult to view the decision of Griffiths CJ in Rogers v Commonwealth as having supported or undermined this trend, the minority view of Isaacs J in the same case was clearly against it. In a judgment reminiscent of the decisions of Eyre CJ and Rooke J in Boulton v Bull, his Honour rejected both the contention of law proposed by O'Connor J and the interpretation of the subject matter suggested by Griffiths CJ, arguing in respect of the former that any subject matter could on current authority support a patent if it involved a new and useful combination of idea and modus operandi.56 As has been seen, this conception of the invention as 'applied idea' was consistent with the approach of UK decision makers throughout the 19th century.
Despite their lack of supporting authority, the judgments of O'Connor J in 
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Ibid 718.
requirement that a subject matter to be patentable must involve the production or treatment of a commercial product. The case in which this requirement was formulated is
which is the first reported case in the history of Anglo-Australian law to consider the inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment.
C The Emergence of Medical Methods as an Issue for Anglo-Australian Patents Law 1 C & W's Application
In C & W's Application a method of extracting lead from human bodies was held ineligible for patent protection because of its lack of association with the manufacture or sale of a 'commercial product', and consequential inability to be regarded as an 'invention' within the meaning of the applicable patents legislation.5 7 58 In reaching his conclusion, the Solicitor-General relied on the original statutory context of the phrase 'manner of new manufacture'59 -including, in particular, the exclusion from patentability by s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies of subject matter 'contrary to the law []or mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient' -to support a conception of the invention as a new or improved thing or substance, or 'a machine or a process that can be used in making something that is, or may be, of commercial value'.60 Whilst a human being could be considered a working organism that would be improved by the method in question, this was not sufficient in the Solicitor-General's opinion to make that method one of relevance to 'manufacture or trade'.61 The result was the acceptance by the Solicitor-General of a general exclusion from patentability covering methods of medical treatment.
Three comments can be made in relation to that exclusion and its rationalisation by the Solicitor-General. The first concerns the SolicitorGeneral's reliance on the proviso in s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Such reliance was consistent with the emphasis of decision makers during the late 19th and early 20th centuries on the literal language of modem patents legislation, and with their related concern to justify in terms of that language the historical exclusions from patentability. One consequence of this trend was a practice during this period of invoking the s 6 proviso to support a particular conclusion regarding a subject matter's inherent patentability.62 To the extent that it reflected this trend C & W's Application was not unusual. Reliance on the proviso in the context of methods of medical treatment was, however, significant in establishing a doctrinal link that would become important later in the 20th century.
57
(1 9 1 4 )3 1 RPC 235. 58 The second comment in respect of C & IT's Application is that no authorities were cited by the Solicitor-General in support of his decision generally or the exclusion of medical methods from patentability specifically. This is partly explicable by reference to the absence of reported decisions involving methods of medical treatment, but also reflects the lack of precedential support for the vendible product requirement itself. Indeed, the only reported decision expressly in favour of a vendible product requirement was that of Heath J in Boulton v Bull -which, as has been seen, was discredited by the approach of decision makers during the 19th century. Whilst the decisions of Buller J in the same case, the Attorney-General in Cooper's Application and O'Connor J in Rogers v Commonwealth63 all came close, they ultimately fell short of stipulating that all inherently patentable methods must involve the production or treatment of a vendible object and remained, in any case, anomalous reflections of a very restrictive understanding of inherent patentability.6 3 64 For these reasons C & W's Application is best explained as the third in a line of early 20th century AngloAustralian cases to support an increasingly narrow interpretation of inherent patentability. Similarly the commercial product requirement articulated in C & VT'i Application -which manifested the trend represented by those cases -is best explained as a useful expedient to support the exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment.
Patents and Designs
This raises the third point concerning C & W's Application, which is that if as contended the commercial product requirement was a means of justifying ex post facto the denial of patents for methods of medical treatment, the question remains as to the reason for that denial. Put differently, why were methods of treating humans considered by the Solicitor-General to be ineligible for patent protection? Whilst the express reason offered by the Solicitor-General was that such methods have no relevance to 'manufacture and trade', exactly how or on what basis that reason was reached is unclear. Consideration of his decision as a whole suggests as its likely basis an unwillingness to treat humans as objects of commercial exploitation. In addition, it appears from the Solicitor-General's judgment that such unwillingness was fuelled by his view that doctors should not, on moral grounds, seek commercial monopolies in respect of their professional skills. This is despite the Solicitor-General's express statement that morality was not a consideration in his finding of unpatentability: 
It h a s b e e n u r g e d , a n d I th in k q u ite r ig h tly , th a t th e q u e s t io n o f h u m a n ity o u g h t n o t to a f f e c t t h e d e c i s i o n in s u c h a c a s e a s th is . . . O f c o u r s e , it is w e ll k n o w n th a t th e m e d i c a l p r o f e s s i o n d o a ll in th e ir p o w e r to d is c o u r a g e m e m b e r s o f th e ir b o d y fr o m o b t a in in g p r o t e c t io n fo r a n y d i s c o v e r y th a t h a s fo r its o b j e c t t h e a lle v i a t io n o f h u m a n s u f f e r in g , a n d it i s i m p o s s ib l e to s p e a k t o o h ig h ly o f s u c h c o n d u c t , b u t it c a n n o t a f f e c t m y j u d g m e n t in a r r iv in g a t a c o n c lu s i o n u p o n t h e te r m s o f t h e S e c t io n o f t h e A c t o f P a r lia m e n t, a n d I h a v e a lt o g e t h e r e x c l u d e d s u c h c o n s id e r a t io n f r o m m y m in d .65
Ultimately, the Solicitor-General's success in not allowing his views regarding the morality of monopolizing medical methods affect his legal judgment must be doubted given the absence of any convincing alternative justification for his decision. In addition the Solicitor-General's assertion that morality was not relevant to inherent patentability, apart from being gratuitous, was inconsistent with the thrust of contemporary UK patents legislation which implicitly acknowledged such relevance in its conferral of power on the Comptroller to 'refuse to grant a patent for an invention ... of which the use would, in his opinion, be contrary to law or morality'.66 It was also arguably inconsistent with the historical prohibition, reflected in s 6 of the Statute o f Monopolies (and thus incorporated into modem Anglo-Australian legislative definitions of 'invention'), against the monopolisation of subject matter considered 'generally inconvenient'67 which, at least in theory,68 provided the Crown and Privy Council with an unfettered discretion to deny patentability on any public policy ground.69
The overall impression created by C & W's Application is that the SolicitorGeneral's eschewal of the relevance of morality to inherent patentability, and his recognition of a commercial product requirement as the basis for a general exclusion from patentability in respect of methods of medical treatment, were the combined result of his refusal: (a) to engage openly with the moral issues purportedly raised by the patenting of medical methods; and (b) to concede that, morality or other public policy aside, there was no sound legal basis for denying patentability to such methods. This impression is borne out by the subsequent history of the medical methods exclusion. Interestingly, it is also consistent with the only other case during the early 20th century in which the relevance of morality to inherent patentability was expressly considered. That case, A & H 's Application,10 involved an appeal from a decision by the Assistant-Comptroller to refuse a patent application in respect of a contraceptive device on the ground that use of such device was 'contrary to ... morality' within the meaning of the applicable patents legislation.7 0 71 On appeal, the patentee disputed this finding by contending that use of a contraceptive device was contrary neither to law nor to morality, and that the application should therefore be permitted to proceed as relating to an 'invention'. Interestingly given his first instance decision, the Assistant-Comptroller when responding to this contention avoided the 'morality' issue and urged the Solicitor-General instead to 'refuse the Grant of a Patent for articles which it would not be fitting to sell as being protected by Royal Letters Patent'.72 7 3 The Solicitor-General complied, thereby also avoiding discussion of the device's morality. He said:
T h e q u e s t io n . . . a r is e s w h e th e r , q u ite ap a rt f r o m S e c t io n 7 5 , 11731 th e C r o w n in th e e x e r c i s e o f its p r e r o g a t iv e c o u l d p o s s i b l y b e e x p e c t e d to e x e r c i s e its d is c r e t i o n to g r a n t a p a te n t f o r a n a r t ic le d e s i g n e d a s a n a p p a r a tu s f o r t h e p r e v e n t io n o f c o n t r a c e p t io n . . . I d e c l i n e to b e a n y p a r t to t h e g r a n t o f a p a te n t fo r th is c l a s s o f a r t ic le . .
. E v e n i f , a s to w h ic h I e x p r e s s n o o p i n io n , its u s e a s a c o n t r a c e p t iv e is c o n s i s t e n t w it h m o r a lit y , I a m n o t p r e p a r e d to e x e r c i s e o n b e h a l f o f t h e C r o w n th e C r o w n 's d i s c r e t io n in fa v o u r o f th e g r a n t o f a p a te n t in r e s p e c t o f i t ... I e x p r e s s n o o p i n io n a s to w h e t h e r th e u s e o f t h e s e a r t ic le s is c o n s i s t e n t w ith m o r a lit y , b e c a u s e I a m n o t a w a r e th a t th e l a w h a s la id d o w n w h a t th e e x a c t s ta n d a r d s o f m o r a lit y a r e. I a m a C o u r t o f L a w , a n d n o t a C o u r t o f M o r a lity . A l l I s a y is I th in k t h e s e a r e n o t a r t ic le s fo r w h ic h , w h e th e r t h e s p e c i f ic a t io n b e a m e n d e d o r n o t , th e C r o w n c a n b e e x p e c t e d to e x e r c i s e its d is c r e t i o n b y w a y o f g r a n tin g a p a te n t. I t h e r e f o r e d i s m i s s t h e A p p e a l.74
Thus, and as in C & IT's Application, the Solicitor-General's suggestion that morality could not be considered when determining inherent patentability left him with the task of finding another legal basis on which to justify rejection of the patent application before him. The fact that the device was a physical object and not a method meant that the 'commercial product' requirement of C & IT's Application was not available to this end. Rather than deriving an equivalent restriction based on the necessary characteristics of an invention, the SolicitorGeneral relied instead on his role as delegate of the Crown, and on the 'inappropriateness' of exercising the Crown's prerogative in respect of articles of dubious moral status. In so doing he avoided the need to engage openly with the moral issues concerning the patenting of a contraceptive device, whilst also avoiding the admission and conclusion that, morality aside, there was no obstacle to allowing the device to be patented. In method this decision was very similar to that of C & IT'^ Application, and supports the conclusions reached in respect of that case above. In both cases a new principle of black letter law masqueraded as public policy. Maeder v Busch concerned a patent application for a method of forming permanent waves in human hair that was opposed, among other things, for its alleged failure to involve an 'invention' on the principles of C & IT's Application. Of the four Judges to hear the opposition, two offered tentative support for C & IT's Application16 and two expressed reservations about its correctness.7 5 7 6 77 None however was prepared to decide the matter finally, and only Dixon J was prepared to consider it in any detail. In the course of such consideration his Honour cast doubt on the limits of the exclusion recognised in C & IT's Application, articulating the problem as follows:
T o b e p a t e n t a b le a n in v e n t i o n m u s t r e la te to a n art.
P e r h a p s t h e w i d e s t s t a t e m e n t is o n e o f t h e e a r lie s t [r e fe r r in g to t h e s ta te m e n t o f E y r e C J in Boulton v Bull]. B u t t h e u lt im a t e e n d in v i e w i s t h e p r o d u c t io n o r tr e a tm e n t o f , o r e f f e c t u p o n , s o m e e n tity . A p p l i c a t i o n s o f o l d t h in g s t o a n e w u s e , a c c o m p a n ie d b y t h e e x e r c i s e o f i n v e n t i v e p o w e r , a r e o f t e n p a t e n t a b le th o u g h th e r e b e n o p r o d u c t io n o f a n e w th in g . B u t in e v e r y c a s e t h e i n v e n t io n m u s t r e fe r to a n d b e a p p lic a b le to a t a n g ib le th in g .
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e r e i s n o t h in g to b e a f f e c t e d b u t th e h a ir. T h e c h e m ic a l c o m p o u n d s a lr e a d y e x is t . T h e u s e o f t h e m , th e a p p lic a t io n o f h e a t a n d th e m e th o d o f tr e a tm e n t c o n s t it u t e n o t h in g b u t m e th o d , p r o c e d u r e , tr e a tm e n t o r p r o c e s s . C a n th e h a ir g r o w in g u p o n t h e h u m a n h e a d b e r e g a r d e d a s s a t is f y in g t h e c o n d i t i o n th a t th e p r o c e s s s h a ll in s o m e w a y r e la te to th e p r o d u c t iv e a r ts? 78
His Honour's answer to this question was ambivalent. On the one hand a method of treating hair was not, he suggested, aimed at producing or helping to produce any article of commerce; no substance or thing forming a possible subject of commerce or contribution to the productive arts being brought into existence by it or with its aid.79 On the other hand, however, the method could be considered to be 'embodied in a manual art or craft' on the ground that its purpose was the treatment of an object of purely mechanical utility.80 Thus the patentability of the method depended in his Honour's view on whether a process to be an invention had to involve the production or treatment of a commercial product (as had been held in C & IT's Application), or merely the production or treatment of some object of mechanical utility so as to reflect a manual art or craft.81 According to Dixon J, however, even the latter view would not save from unpatentability methods of treating or manipulating a vital part of the human body which, he held, would always lack the artificial or mechanical element of an invention.82 The effect of Justice Dixon's reasoning was two-fold. First, it challenged the breadth of the existing scope of the medical methods exclusion beyond methods having a therapeutic purpose. But second, it added new weight to the exclusion so restricted by identifying as its underlying justification the inherent inability of methods of treating a vital part of the human body to possess the artificiality required of an invention. That justification was not affected by the question raised by Dixon J concerning the correctness of the commercial product requirement, and suggested as the critical distinction for methods of medical treatment the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' subject matter. Exactly why a method of treating a living thing such as a human being should not be considered 'artificial' was not explicated by Dixon J and is difficult to understand. Specifically, it is difficult to see how the 'naturalness' of the object of a method can be viewed as affecting the artificiality or otherwise of the method itself; a point implicitly acknowledged by Evatt J in the following passage from the same case:
[I]t was suggested that, under the Patents Act, assuming that every other element necessary to establish a valid patent is present, the mere fact that the curls are to be produced on the head of a living person precludes a valid grant. The question whether this one fact -that curls are to be made on the head of a living personprevents the issue of a grant need not here be decided; but I am inclined to the opinion that providing all the other elements of patentability are present, it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule that although the making of artificial curls for subsequent use on the human head can be protected by a patentable process, doing very much the same thing with the hair that is already on the head cannot be protected.83
Ultimately, the justification offered by Dixon J for a continued medical methods exclusion independent of any vendible product requirement is unconvincing, and reflects the same concern as in C & IT's Application to entrench that exclusion without proper consideration of its underlying basis. Unlike the Solicitor-General in C & IT's Application, however, Justice Dixon's decision appears genuinely not to have been motivated by any moral concerns regarding the patenting of medical methods; his Honour having expressly (and convincingly) stated that the purpose for or vocation in which the alleged invention was to be used could not in logic be relevant to its patentability.84 Exactly why Dixon J was so adamant in affirming the exclusion, despite his otherwise cautious and well-reasoned decision, is unclear. The fact remains, however, that his decision in this regard reflected for the second time in as many decisions the adaptation of first principles of patents law to support an unconvincing view of medical methods as lacking the characteristics required of inventions.
3 The Commercial Product Requirement and Medical Methods Exclusion After Maeder v Busch Justice Dixon's questioning of the commercial product requirement and reformulation of the legal basis for the medical methods exclusion had no effect on the approach of UK decision makers for the two decades following Maeder v Busch. Indeed, four years after that case the commercial product requirement was approved and entrenched in the UK by the decision of the Patents Appeal Tribunal ('PAT') in G E C's Application.85 The alleged invention in G E C's Application was somewhat similar to that of Rogers v Commonwealth86 and, in a judgment reminiscent of the judgment of O'Connor J therein, was denied a patent for its failure to involve the production, improvement, restoration or preservation of a vendible product.87 In support of the requirement for such involvement the PAT in G E C's Application confirmed the inherent unpatentability of 'processes or methods of treating diseases in human beings';88 its reasoning in this regard being somewhat ironic given the original justification of the medical methods exclusion by reference to the vendible product requirement itself.89 Put differently, it is ironic that the medical methods exclusion was now being relied on to support the restrictive conception of inherent patentability from which that exclusion was itself originally said to derive.
The circularity of the reasoning in G E C's Application belied the ongoing instability of the legal foundation on which the vendible product requirement and the (purportedly related) rule against patenting medical methods rested, even in the UK. Some acknowledgement of that instability was reflected almost immediately during the 1940s, when Evershed LJ attempted to relax the vendible product requirement in order, his Lordship held, that it not restrict the common language meaning of 'manner of new manufacture'90 and through it the statutory definition of 'invention' per se.91 The initial focus of Evershed LJ in this regard was on the word 'product' which he stated could only be reconciled with 'manner of new manufacture' if it was understood as having been used by Morton LJ as The immediate effect of this clarification was to concede as inherently patentable methods involving the treatment of any (vendible) tangible matter regardless of its physicality or artificiality.93 Whilst a human body is clearly a 'tangible matter', the problem remained of the more restrictive aspect of Lord Justice Morton's rules which required that the product of a patentable process be 'vendible'. That requirement was also elucidated by Evershed LJ during the 1940s, when his Lordship held in Re an Application for a Patent by Rantzen94 that a 'vendible product' was not confined to something that could be passed from one man to another upon a transaction of purchase or sale, but rather encompassed anything that might 'fairly be regarded as the outcome of a process of manufacture'.95 Even had this liberal interpretation of the vendible product requirement been supported by his Honour's contemporaries (which it was not),96 it would still have precluded the patenting of methods of medical treatment. Thus, by 1959, methods of treating the human body remained inherently unpatentable both in the UK (by operation of the vendible product requirement) and in Australia (by operation of the same requirement and/or the need for production or treatment of an artificial product). In that year the rift between UK and Australian law, already evident in Maeder v Busch, widened with the important97 9 8 decision of the High Court of Australia in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner o f Patents ('NRDC').9% The effect of this decision was to demolish both the vendible product requirement and the requirement recognised by Dixon J for the production or treatment of an artificial product. Amazingly, however, the exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment that had previously rested on those requirements continued intact.
I ll THE PATENTABILITY OF METHODS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UK FROM 1959
A Revision of the Vendible Product Requirement and its Implications for Methods of Medical Treatment NRDC involved a method of using a known chemical substance to treat soil in order to eradicate and control weeds from crop areas without affecting the crops themselves." The issue it raised was whether such a method was precluded from patentability because, among other things, of its failure to result in any new or improved vendible product. In a unanimous decision the High Court held that it was not so precluded on the ground that it was a proper subject of letters patent according to the historically developed principles governing application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies', its purpose being to create a 'vendible product' in the sense of an artificially created end of practical utility.9 9 100
There are two aspects, to the High Court's finding on this point. The first concerns the question to be posed by decision makers in determining the existence of an 'invention' within the meaning of modem patents legislation, and the second concerns the essential attributes of an invention so defined. In respect of the first of these aspects the Court held that the right question is not "'Is this a manner (or kind) of manufacture?"', but rather '"Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for the application of s. 6 of the Statute o f Monopolies!"' .101 By emphasizing the spirit of the Statute of Monopolies over its literal terms, the Court vindicated the approach of Rooke J in Boulton v Bull more than 150 years earlier.
In respect of the second aspect of the NRDC decision concerning the essential attributes of an invention, the Court's reasoning proceeded as follows. First, the Court noted the comment by the Chief Justice in Maeder v Busch that a widening conception of the invention had been a characteristic of the growth of patents law,102 1 0 3 1 0 4 and cited as examples of the accuracy of that statement the conceptions of the invention articulated by Eyre CJ in Boulton v Bull103 and Tindal CJ in Crane v Price.m It then described, as the central unresolved issue concerning such conception, 'whether it is enough that a process [to be patentable] produces a useful result or whether it is necessary that some physical thing is either brought into existence or so affected as the better to serve man's purposes',105 before reviewing the early 20th century Anglo-Australian case law in respect of that issue including, in particular, G E C's Application and the line of cases in which the rules there articulated were subsequently applied.106 Such review was concluded by the Court with the statement that the rules of G E C's Application could only be upheld as 'wide enough to convey the broad idea which the long line of decisions on the subject has shown to be comprehended by the Statute'107 if the word 'product' in those rules was understood 'as covering every end produced',108 and the word '"vendible" as pointing only to the requirement of utility in practical affairs'.109 The effect of this conclusion was to bring NRDC's method within the scope of those rules, as a method '[having] as its end result an artificial effect falling squarely within the true concept of what must be produced by a process if it is to be held patentable'.110 The Court extrapolated:
This view is, we think, required by a sound understanding of the lines along which patents law has developed and necessarily must develop in a modern society. The effect produced by the appellant's method exhibits the two essential qualities upon which 'product' and 'vendible' seem designed to insist. It is a 'product' because it consists in an artificially created state of affairs, discernible by observing over a period the growth of weeds and crops respectively on sown land on which the method has been put into practice. And the significance of the product is economic; for it provides a remarkable advantage, indeed to the lay mind a sensational advantage, for one of the most elemental activities by which man has served his material needs, the cultivation of the soil for the production of its fruits.111
Thus, in the view of the High Court, any method resulting in an objectively discernible and artificially created state of affairs of economic significance would be a proper subject of letters patent within the meaning of the Statute of Monopolies; a subject matter of this type being a method producing an end of utility in practical affairs. The effect of this view was to bring inherent patentability back into line with 19th century authorities, and to undermine the two historical reasons expressed for denying patents to medical methods. Such effect was not however recognised by the High Court -or at least was not recognised as being sufficient to permit the patenting of methods of medical treatment. Hence the Court's rather tentative112 suggestion that [t] he exclusion of methods of surgery and other processes for treating the human body may well lie outside the concept of invention because the whole subject is conceived as essentially non-economic.113 This suggestion that the exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment could be justified on the basis of their non-economic value is unconvincing. Indeed, it is difficult to see how medical methods could be devoid of 'economic significance' in the broad sense in which that phrase was understood in NRDC when they are routinely performed for commercial profit. As with the decision of Dixon J in Maeder v Busch, the High Court's apparent refusal to concede the implications for methods of medical treatment of its own principles of inherent patentability reflects an unchallenged assumption that such methods were an inappropriate subject matter for patent protection. The result in NRDC, as for Dixon J in Maeder v Busch, was the dubious adaptation of first principles of inherent patentability to justify perpetuation of the medical methods exclusion. During the 1960s, the High Court's continued recognition of an exclusion in respect of methods of medical treatment was welcomed in the UK as vindicating the result of C & ITs Application. The High Court's justification of that exclusion by reference to the 'essentially non-economic' nature of such methods was, however, largely ignored. This left decision makers in the (no longer novel) position of having a recognised exclusion that they were keen to perpetuate but no recognised legal basis on which to do so. Their response was to borrow from the emerging jurisprudence regarding another subject matter involving living matter -biotechnology -and in so doing to revert to the reasoning of Dixon J in Maeder v Busch.
B 1960-70: Methods of Medical Treatment as Insufficiently Artificial
The only reported cases to involve a patent application in respect of a method of medical treatment in the decade following NRDC were decided in the UK. Each of those cases upheld the historical exclusion of medical methods114 and many relied in doing so on NRDC.115 The central reason offered for that exclusion was not however that such methods lacked commercial value as had been held in NRDC, but rather that they lacked the artificiality required of inventions. In addition to supporting the approach of Dixon J in Maeder v Busch, this reason reflected contemporary decisions in which agricultural and biotechnological subject matter had been denied patentability on the basis of their dependence upon the physiological functions of a higher life form, and consequential inability to be regarded as controllably responsive to human operation. Application117 in respect of a method of treating live animals, and was adapted during the 1960s to support the exclusion from patentability of methods of treating humans.1 1 7 118 Thus in Neva Corporation's Application ( 'Neva')119 a method of inducing a state of reduced awareness in humans (and animals) by means of sounds generated by a known apparatus was held to be an unpatentable method of medical treatment on the ground that its utility depended upon the reception and interaction of the sounds with the human brain. This was consistent with London Rubber Industries L td 's Patent ( 'London Rubber'),120 where a method of controlling female ovulation through the prescribed oral administration of known hormones was refused a patent on the ground, implicitly, that the utility of such method depended upon the physiological response of the person treated and for this reason fell outside the realm of useful arts in which inventions exist.121 1 2 2 In one of the very few early decisions that expressly considered the reason for the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from inherent patentability, the PAT in London Rubber reconciled its decision with NRDC as follows:
[In NRDC i]t was suggested that the justification for excluding from the concept of invention methods of surgery or other processes for the treatment of the human body might well rest upon the fact that they are essentially non-economic and the reference in the judgment to Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 C.L.R. 684 at 706 shows that by this is meant that: (a) the object is not to produce or aid in the production of any article of commerce; (b) no substance or thing forming a possible subject of commerce or a contribution to the productive arts is to be brought into existence by means of or with the aid of the process ...
[T]he improvisation of a method of treating a human being cannot in reason be regarded as affording proper subject matter for letters patent. If for the purposes of argument the oral administration of specific pills in a controlled manner be taken to be a method or constitute a process, it still cannot be asserted with any reality that the human response to the ingredients so administered falls within any category of the useful arts/22
In this passage the Swift & Company's Application emphasis on human control is reconciled with the NRDC emphasis on results of commercial significance by positing as the results of medical methods, the human response to them which, in NRDC terms, was considered 'essentially non-economic'. It was not long however before this rather tortuous explication of the two decisions was rejected, and the reconception of the medical methods exclusion on public policy grounds began. Cracks in the fa9ade of London Rubber were already evident in the 1970 case of Palm er 's Application. 123 In that case, a Superintending Examiner's finding of inherent unpatentability in respect of a method of treatment that depended for its efficacy upon the physiological response of the persons treated was overruled on appeal, on the basis that a method so depending could still involve the practical employment of a person's art and skill so as to constitute an invention.124 The effect of such recognition was to remove yet again the primary legal obstacle to the inherent patentability of surgical and therapeutic methods. Whilst that effect was acknowledged the following year in Schering A G 's Application ( 'Sobering'),125 its acknowledgement was still not sufficient to secure a reversal of the historical rule against the patenting of such methods, with the PAT in Schering once again finding a new justification for that rule's perpetuation. While consistent with the trend of past cases in this respect, in another respect the PAT's judgment represented a radical departure from those cases. Such departure came with its concession that morality both should and could provide a basis for denying patents to medical methods; a concession that constituted an important step in the reconception of the medical methods exclusion. The subject matter in Schering was a method of female contraception almost identical to that in London Rubber but, contrary to the decision in London Rubber, was allowed to proceed to grant in the face of opposition for patent ineligibility. At first instance,126 1 2 7 the Superintending Examiner ('SE') focused on distinguishing Palm er's Application in order to preserve the historical position regarding methods of medical treatment, the correctness of which, he noted, was confirmed in NRDC.121 On appeal, in contrast,128 the PAT avoided discussion of Palm er's Application opting instead for a first principles analysis that led it to the following four central observations: 'The method in question was the result of considerable research effort, and represented a novel and important contribution to the techniques of contraception'.129 Whilst it was plainly arguable upon ethical grounds that there should be no patent protection in the medical field at all, the patentability under UK law of pharmaceutical substances and curative devices had long been recognised, and had resulted in an enormous investment in the field of medical research.130 Such patentability was subject to certain legislative safeguards against unwarrantable exploitation.131
If the practice of awarding patents for medical substances and devices in order to encourage further investment in medical research was approved -and if the object of the patent system was in truth to give hope of a reward to people whose research and industry resulted in valuable products or processes -there could be no logical basis for not extending that practice to medical methods, subject to extension also of the legislative safeguards applicable in respect of medical substances and devices.132
Whilst the denial of patents to methods of medical treatment had historically been considered axiomatic, the demise of the need for any treatment or production of a commercial object made the logic of such denial unclear.133
Despite these observations, the PAT concluded that the absence in contemporary patents legislation of safeguards against the unwarranted exploitation of processes for medical treatment, as existed for medical substances and devices,134 reflected a clear assumption by Parliament that methods of medical treatment could not be patented.135 This raised the question as to the meaning of 'method of medical treatment' in this context and as to whether that meaning included methods of contraception such as that in issue.136 The PAT held it did not, 'medical treatment' denoting treatments to cure or prevent disease.137
The overall significance of the decision in Schering is four-fold. First, it confirmed as the primary justification for the conferring of patents the rewarding of inventors for their introduction within the jurisdiction of new and useful objects through the expenditure of skill, effort and expense.138 Secondly, it confirmed the applicability of this justification in respect of methods of medical treatment, thereby removing any first principle policy objections to the patenting of such methods and affirming generally the non-discriminatory bias of inherent patentability central to the decision in NRDC.m Thirdly, it confirmed the absence of any relevant distinction for patentability purposes between methods of medical treatment on the one hand and medical substances and devices on the other, and conceded the absence of any logical basis for treating the former as a 'fine art' and the latter as an invention or 'useful art'. The effect of this concession was to confirm the inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment pursuant to the principles of NRDC and emphasise -for the second time1 3 9 140 -the illogicality of intuitive objections to the patenting of such methods given the absence of similar objections in respect of medical products.
This raises the fourth point regarding Schering, which concerns the PAT's suggestion that, express legislative provision aside, the only legitimate ground on which methods of medical treatment could be denied inherent patentability was that of ethics. This reconception of the medical methods exclusion in moral terms reflected two things. First, it reflected yet another attempt by an AngloAustralian decision maker to find a legitimate basis for perpetuating that exclusion. And secondly -in a radical departure from existing jurisprudence -it reflected an admission that the only such basis that existed was morality. The foundation for that admission, however, remained unclear. Specifically, the PAT in Schering offered no legal justification to support its view of morality as relevant to inherent patentability, let alone any policy justification to support its view of morality as requiring the exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment. In respect of the first of these points there remained the historical principle against the relevance of morality to inherent patentability; a principle that, as has been seen, was established in the context of medical methods themselves.141 In respect of the second, the PAT merely accepted without critical discussion that moral objections to the patenting of medical methods not only existed, but were such as to require prima facie the exclusion from patentability of all medical subject matter, whether method or product.142
One final point of interest about Schering should be noted, and that is the absence of any suggestion by the SE or PAT that the alleged invention should be denied patentability on the basis of the immorality of its contraceptive purpose, which was the approach in Barwick CJ held that a method of cosmetic treatment was inherently patentable by reason of its commercial significance (consistent with NRDC), and suggested that any general exclusion from inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment -which his Honour defined narrowly as methods 'for medical treatment of human disease, malfunction, disability or incapacity of the human body or any other part of it'145 not including methods of cosmetic treatment such as that in issue146 -could only be justified at common law on 'public policy [grounds] as being, in the language of the Statute o f Monopolies, "generally inconvenient"'.147 The implication of this suggestion was that the only legitimate basis on which the inherent patentability of medical methods could be denied was public policy and that, public policy aside, medical methods were 'inventions' within the meaning of NRDC and the Statute o f Monopolies.148
Two points were central to the decision in Joos. The first concerns the effect of NRDC which, his Honour held, was to establish as inherently patentable any process having economic value, whether or not 'directly supplied by the nature of the activity which would utilise the process';149 a finding that directly undermined the treatment of medical methods in that case as 'essentially non economic'. And the second concerns the phrase 'general inconvenience' in s 6 of the Statute o f Monopolies which, the Chief Justice suggested, could provide a general public policy basis for the exclusion of subject matter from inherent patentability.150 This suggestion recognised for the first time a legal basis for opposing inherent patentability on moral grounds. The Chief Justice's reliance to In this case, the processes are to be used in what cannot be described otherwise than as a commercial activity o f hairdressing, a sector of activity that accounts, I imagine, for a great deal of employment. I could not assign the skill of the hairdresser to the area of the fine arts and have little difficulty placing it in the area o f the useful arts. In my opinion, it is an activity in the field of economic endeavour and has commercial significance as those expressions ought to be understood in relation to the grants o f patents. Therefore, it could not be said, in my opinion, that the application should not be allowed to proceed because clearly it had no commercial significance in the relevant aspect.
this end on general inconvenience was consistent with two (then) recent decisions of the UK PAT and SE.151 Whilst his Honour referred to neither of those decisions, the effect of his judgment was to support their interpretation of 'general inconvenience' and to confirm the existence under Australian patents law of a general discretion permitting decision makers to deny patentability to any subject matter on public policy grounds.152 It is interesting that the source of this discretion -the proviso to s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies -was the same as that relied on by the Solicitor-General in C & W's Application to support the vendible product requirement from which the medical methods exclusion was (then) said to derive.153
(d) The Acceptance of Joos in the UK to 1977
After Joos it was generally accepted by UK decision makers that any historical reason in principle or logic for the denial of patent protection to methods of medical treatment was removed by the test of inherent patentability articulated in NRDC, despite the apparent confirmation in that case that medical methods could not support a patent.154 It was also accepted however that methods of medical treatment could, in theory, still be legitimately regarded as beyond the scope of s 6 of the Statute o f Monopolies -and therefore beyond the definition of 'invention' in contemporary patents legislation -on ethical grounds which, it was assumed, were accommodated within the concept of 'general inconvenience' contained in that section.155 This had the effect of reducing the question of the inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment to a question of public policy and, more specifically, to the question of whether allowing patents for such methods would be unethical or otherwise 'generally inconvenient' within the principles developed in respect of that concept under the Statute of Monopolies. Despite this, the issue of the ethics of permitting patents for methods of medical treatment continued to elude the direct attention of UK decision makers. This is notwithstanding the shift reflected in post-Joos cases in the intuitive response of decision makers to that issue, as evidenced by the following statement of the PAT in Eli Lilly & Company's Application {'Eli Lilly'):156
The reasons for such exclusion [of methods of medical treatment from patentability] appears to us to be based in ethics rather than logic but if there is to be a change of policy, which would appear to us to be sensible, this ought in our view to be effected by legislation rather than by interpretation.157
Two things are interesting about this statement. The first is the PAT's suggestion that the policy against allowing patents for medical methods on ethical grounds should be changed, and the second is its suggestion that effecting such change is a matter for the legislature and not the courts. Thus, whilst recognizing the ethical basis of the medical methods exclusion, the PAT questioned the courts' competency to reconsider that basis in order to displace the exclusion and permit patents for methods of medical treatment.158 In addition to vindicating the view of the Solicitors-General in C & VT's Application and A & H 's Application 50 years earlier regarding the inappropriateness of considering morality when determining inherent patentability, the PAT's approach in Eli Lilly showed the ongoing intransigence of the medical methods exclusion even after judicial support for its perpetuation had declined. ss l( l) ( c ), 4) and the EPC (arts 52(1), 57, 52(4) ) is equivalent to the requirement for utility under Australian law.
exclusion has a public policy justification is, however, recognised by the courts, although -and consistent with the stirrings of the PAT in Eli Lilly -that justification is no longer accorded the respect shown by the Solicitor-General in C & VP's Application and the PAT in Schering. This is reflected in the following passage from the judgment of Jacob J in the 1998 case of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Inc ( 'Bristol-Myers v Baker Norton' ):162 [T] he limited purpose of the [s 4(2)] exception ... is not so broad as to stop doctors using whatever they feel they need to treat patients. If that were the purpose then one would not allow patents for medicines or medical implements at all. The purpose of the limitation is much narrower, merely to keep patent law from interfering directly with what the doctor actually does to the patient. Patent monopolies are permitted to control what he administers to, or the implements he uses on, the patient. The thinking behind the exception is not particularly rational: if one accepts that a patent monopoly is a fair price to pay for the extra research incentive, then there is no reason to suppose that that would not apply also to methods of treatment. It is noteworthy that in the U.S. any such exception has gone, and yet no-one, so far as I know, suggests that its removal has caused any trouble.163
The irony of the UK legislature's entrenchment of the medical methods exclusion -which for the first time removes any doubt as to the legal basis for that exclusion -at precisely the time when decision makers were starting to question its public policy basis cannot be ignored. Not surprisingly, the shift away from viewing the patenting of methods of medical treatment as contrary to public policy has not been confined to the UK, but rather is reflected amongst decision makers in most jurisdictions around the world.164 In the following section the impact of that global shift on the scope of s 4(2) to date will be considered. The conclusion from such consideration is that the loss of judicial support for the medical methods exclusion entrenched by that section is unlikely to have the same impact in the UK as in other countries faced with the same exclusion and shifting judicial perspectives regarding the ethics of medical method patents.
(b) The Liberalisation of the UK Approach to Medical Method Patents
The relaxation of judicial attitudes to methods of medical treatment discernible in the 1970s is also reflected in the earliest cases involving s 4(2) of the 1977 Act, which go some way to limiting the impact of that section on the availability of patent protection for medical methods in the UK. For example, in the 1980 case of Blendax-Werke's Application ('Blendax'),165 Graham J of the Patents Court approved the principle -which he himself had articulated 10 years earlier in Organon Laboratories Limited's Application ('Organon') 166 -that the inventor of a method of medical treatment involving a novel and inventive means of administering known drugs could obtain 'back-door' protection for such method by patenting the form in which the drugs are packaged. The reason offered in Organon for this principle was that there would be 'no reason why [anyone] should want to [use the packaging] except for the new treatment';167 a fact that also precluded the argument that permitting the patent would cause 'general inconvenience '.168 Both the conclusion and reasoning of Organon were upheld in Blendax as a legitimate means of circumventing s 4(2) of the 1977 Act. In the words of Graham J, I do not ... see why the applicant, who has invented a valuable process which, owing to the law as it stands at present, he cannot claim as a process, should not be able, as far as he can, to get a monopoly for packs or other articles which are useful in that process, so that he can in effect rely on the value of his discoveiv in claiming something which otherwise people might think had no subject matter.16Â similarly liberal approach to s 4(2) is reflected in the second of the post-1977 Act cases to involve a method of medical treatment, which is StaffordMiller Ltd's Applications ('Stafford-Miller') .170 The patent in that case was for a method of controlling extoparasites or their ova on humans,171 and the issue turned on whether such method fell within the scope of s 4(2) as a 'method of treatment of the human ... body by ... therapy'. Overruling a decision of the SE that it did so fall, the Patents Court upheld the Court of Appeal's decision in Upjohn, restricting operation of the medical methods exclusion to 'method[s] of treatment of a human ailment'.172 The Patents Court concluded that 'a treatment involving the destruction of parasites which are to be found on the body or in the hair' was not such a method.173 The reason given by Whitford J for this conclusion was that the object of the treatment was outside the body, and that whilst the distinction for s 4(2) purposes between treating organisms outside and inside the body may well be somewhat strange ... a line has to be drawn somewhere and I am not sufficiently satisfied that these claims fall on the wrong side of the line as to justify saying at this stage in their life that these patents are incapable of providing a good basis for a sound claim.174
Overall, the decisions in Blendax and Stajford-Miller go some way to limiting the impact of s 4(2) on the scope of patentability by means of principles formulated in the 1970s. The liberal approach reflected in those decisions reached its limit, however, in the 1980s, when a new genre of patent claims aimed at defeating that section emerged. So-called 'Swiss style' claims are claims for the 'use of substance or composition X for the manufacture of a medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic application'.175 Whilst claims described in this manner do not on their face involve methods of medical treatment, they do involve uses of a known substance and are thus prima facie unpatentable for lack of novelty under s 2 of the 1977 Act. An issue arises however by virtue of s 2(6) of that Act, which provides an express exemption from the novelty requirement for certain uses of known substances in methods of medical treatment, as follows:
In the case of an invention consisting of a substance or composition for use in a method [excluded from patentability by s 4(2)], the fact that the substance or composition forms part of the state of the art shall not prevent the invention from being taken to be new if the use of the substance or composition in any such method does not form part of the state of the art.
When initially considered, this provision was held in the UK not to cover Swiss style claims on the ground that its application was limited to the first use of a known substance in any method of medical treatment.176 This interpretation was supported by the legislative intent underlying that provision and, it was said, by the intent underlying the equivalently worded art 54(5) of the EPC.177 A problem arose, however, when the Enlarged Board of the European Patent Office ('EPO') disagreed with this construction of art 54(5).178 According to the Board, the novelty of any second or subsequent medical use of a known substance derived, for the purposes of art 54(5), from that second or subsequent use itself; the claims envisaged by article 54(5) being purpose-limited product claims to a known substance or composition when used in a particular medical method.179 This finding formed the basis of a second decision by the Enlarged Board in Mobil/Friction Reducing Additive ('Mobil').180 In that case it was held that the use of a known compound in a known method to achieve a new technical effect would only be invalid for lack of novelty if such effect had previously been made available to the public. In considering whether an effect had 'previously been made available', the Board emphasised the need to draw 'a line ... between what is in fact made available, and what remains hidden or otherwise has not been made available';181 noting that the mere fact of an effect having 'inherently taken place in the course of carrying out what [had] previously been made available' was not sufficient to destroy the use's novelty.182 The effect of this reasoning is to emasculate the medical methods exclusion contained in art 52(4) by enabling any method of medical treatment involving the use of a known substance to be protected as a 'second medical indication' or 'purpose-limited product', provided only that such substance has not previously and knowingly been used for the same purpose in the same medical treatment.183 1 8 4 The result is that medical methods involving the use of a substance can support a patent under the EPC if described in Swiss style form.
The impact of the EPO's acceptance of Swiss style claims on UK law has been decisive. Having had their patents system pegged to that of the EPC,m UK decision makers have been forced to adopt the EPO position in relation to those claims in the interests of doctrinal conformity185 and despite their clear rejection of its correctness.186 Since this adoption, however, the same decision makers have been working to find paths around the EPO principles. To date two such paths have been identified. The first involves recognition of a more rigorous 'supporting description' standard in respect of Swiss style claims, under which full disclosure is required not only of the substance, but also of the means by which that substance is to be used in the medical treatment (including dosage amounts and forms of administration).187 This requirement for detailed supporting description has been relied on several times already to strike down a second medical use patent,188 despite objections by some applicants that it cannot reasonably be satisfied until full and proper testing has been undertaken, which itself cannot occur until after a patent has been granted.189
The second means by which UK decision makers have avoided the effect of EPO authorities regarding Swiss style claims has been to distinguish them on the facts of individual cases. This was the approach adopted more recently by the Patents Court in 190 where Jacob J -after almost lamenting his inability to declare such authorities 'bad law'191 -proceeded to strike down a second medical use patent on the ground that it was not a case of a second or other medical use at all, but rather 'a case of a mere discovery about an old use'.192 The effect of his Honour's decision is to undermine Mobil by providing a means for excluding from patentability uses of a known compound previously used in the same manner but for the purpose of achieving a different technical effect.193
It is tempting to view contemporary UK law regarding methods of medical treatment as vindicating the decision of the Solicitor-General in C & IT's Application nearly 90 years ago, in which the exclusion from patentability in respect of such methods was first recognised. However, whilst the existence of that exclusion has never been doubted, the fact of such existence remains the only consistent and reliable theme in the history of medical method patents in the UK to date. Indeed, so intransigent has the exclusion been that it has survived the discrediting of its various legal bases and the shift in judicial attitude to the public policy issues underlying them. Whilst such intransigence has not been shown in Australia, the development of the principles governing medical methods since 1977 continues to chart the same general course there as in the UK. The purpose of the following and concluding section is to consider this development.
Methods o f Medical Treatment in Australia Since 1977
It is a remarkable fact, given the length of time that had passed since the PAT's initial suggestion in Schering that morality was a legitimate basis for the exclusion of medical methods from patentability, that the nature and force of the moral issues raised by the patenting of such methods were not considered in detail until 1992. Less surprising, given the historical trend of decision making in this area, is that when they were so considered it was by an Australian and not a UK court. Also unsurprising in light of this trend -and in light of the shift in judicial attitudes to the patenting of medical methods generally -is that when considered, morality was deemed insufficient to justify the denial of patentability to such methods at all. The case in which that consideration was undertaken is Rescare.194 Rescare involved methods for treating obstructive sleep apnoea, more commonly known as snoring. In a strong judgment, Gummow J confirmed the inherent patentability of the methods on the test set by Barwick CJ in Joos, resolving the public policy question at the heart of that test as follows:
Counsel for the respondent ... submitted that [the method claims were] 'generally inconvenient' within the Statute of Monopolies because: (i) modern medicine depends on technological innovation and it is in the public interest that this should be published and freely available; (ii) to grant a monopoly in respect of methods of treatment of disease would be 'inconsistent' with the teaching of medical students and practitioners of such methods; (iii) if such grants were permitted the medical practitioner who applied the treatment without a licence and the patient who authorised the treatment would be infringers; and (iv) the dissemination of the description of the method by a teacher or medical writer might amount to exploitation of the invention within the meaning of the definition of 'exploit' in Sch 1 of the 1990 Act and thus to infringement; and (v) the patentee would be able to refuse to license the invention or to charge substantial licensing fees, subject only to the operation of the compulsory licence and Crown use provisions in chs 12 and 17 of the 1990 Act.
Counsel for the applicant responded to point (v) that the position was no different with patents for pharmaceutical products. As to the other points, it was most unlikely that the patient who authorised the use of the process upon his or her person would be held to infringe or that a medical teacher or writer would either exploit the invention or authorise such exploitation within the meaning of the 1990 Act.195 By this reasoning, his Honour rejected the respondent's argument that the methods of treatment should be denied a patent for general inconvenience, thereby overruling the medical methods exclusion for the purposes of Australian law.196 That decision was upheld on appeal by a divided Full Court.197 Whilst the three Judges constituting the Court agreed with Justice Gummow's conception and resolution of the issue in terms of 'general inconvenience' and public policy, only two -Lockhart and Wilcox JJ -held the public interest to favour patentability. In the principal judgment of the Court, Lockhart J relied heavily on a 1979 decision of Davison CJ of the Supreme Court of New Zealand198 to reason as follows: The statement by the court in [Eli Lilly] that in dealing with the exclusion of a process for medical treatment from patent protection 'the reasons for such an exclusion appear to us to be based in ethics rather than logic' was criticised, correctly in my respectful opinion, by Davison CJ ... The original basis which was reaffirmed in the C and W case in 1914 was not ethics, but that a process for medical treatment was not 'an art of manufacture' or was not a form of manufacture or trade. As Davison CJ observed ... now that the foundation for the decision in the C and W case has been removed by subsequent decisions, the courts have been grasping for some other ground on which to base a refusal to exclude processes for medical treatment from patent protection. The Chief Justice found no warrant in the law for grounding such refusal on ethical considerations. He said that the law permits the granting of a patent for a drug, the inventor has rights to it, and it can be employed in medical treatments only if made available to the medical profession by reason of licensing or compulsory licensing. If a process for medical treatment is invented, it can be licensed it the same way ... As members of the public are not currently deprived of the use of drugs under the existing law, Davison CJ saw no reason why the public would be deprived of the use of patented methods of medical treatment...
Davison CJ said that on the other hand there were sound grounds for granting patent protection for processes of medical treatment which by research result from discovery of the fact that new properties and new uses exist for known chemicals. There would be reduced incentive to expend time, effort and money, often necessary to make such discoveries, if no financial return was to be available. Drugs have long been recognised as patentable subject matter. I respectfully adopt the Chief Justice's comments. Once the notion of the necessity for a 'vendible product' is eliminated there is no distinction in principle between a product for treating the human body and a method of treating the human body.199
Two points are implicit in this reasoning. The first is that the reliance by UK decision makers on ethics to support a medical methods exclusion following the abolition of the vendible product requirement was a reflection of ex post facto justification rather than sound legal reasoning. And the second is that any ethical arguments against the patenting of medical methods were outweighed by the need to encourage medical research and by the long-standing acceptance of the patentability of medical products.200 Justice Wilcox agreed. In addition, his Honour distinguished the line of UK authorities in favour of the medical methods exclusion as 'not so deeply embedded in Australian law as to preclude an appellate court departing from it'.201 Indeed, according to Wilcox J, it was obvious that the High Court of Australia had, in each of the three cases in which the issue was raised (Maeder v Busch, NRDC and Joos), assumed rather than decided the existence of a medical methods exclusion.202 The result, his Honour suggested, was that methods of medical treatment were not only inherently patentable under Australian law, but had never been declared by an Australian Court to be otherwise.203 In this way, Wilcox J relied on the dubiousness of the High Court's reasons for affirming the medical methods exclusion as evidence of its lack of genuine support for that exclusion. Whilst this view is arguable in relation to Chief Justice Barwick's decision in Joos, and even in relation to NRDC, it is a less convincing explanation of Justice Dixon's decision in Maeder v Busch, in which the unpatentability of medical methods was more clearly asserted.
Challenging the view of the majority in the Rescare appeal was Sheppard J, who delivered a strong dissent against patentability. Central to his Honour's decision was the view that the need not to impede the work of those engaged in the alleviation of human suffering outweighed the need to encourage medical research and, more specifically, that permitting the monopolisation of means of treating potentially life-threatening illness would be 'generally inconvenient' within the meaning of the Statute o f Monopolies.™ In his Honour's words:
It is not going too far, I think, to say that the Court should not contemplate the grant of letters patent which would give to one medical practitioner, or perhaps a group of medical practitioners, a monopoly over, for example, a surgical procedure which might be greatly beneficial to mankind. Its denial might mean the death or unnecessary suffering of countless people. I cannot think that this is really what the medical profession as a whole would seek to achieve. Its whole history is a denial of the proposition.2 0 4 205 Although in dissent, the decision of Sheppard J was upheld and applied by Heerey J of the Federal Court at first instance in Bristol-Myers, the next (and most recent) case to consider the medical methods issue in Australia.206 Not surprisingly, however, given the weight of authority against that decision, Justice Heerey's judgment in Bristol-Myers did not survive on appeal to the Full Court, which unanimously affirmed the inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment on the principles expressed by Lockhart and Wilcox JJ in the Rescare appeal.207 Whilst the Full Court's decision in Bristol-Myers offers no new insight to the public policy issues on which the division of opinion in the Rescare litigation turned, it does reignite the historical issue concerning the legal basis for denying patentability on moral grounds and, in so doing, casts doubt over the ability and willingness of Australian judges to engage with moral issues when determining inherent patentability. moral or ethical issues made that question an inappropriate one for the courts;212 the result being that medical methods should remain inherently patentable unless and until Parliament legislates to the contrary. This view receives some support from the decision of Wilcox J in Rescare213 2 1 4 and reflects also the approach of the UK PAT in the 1970s' cases of Eli Lilly and Upjohn.lu Ultimately, however, it goes beyond those decisions in its suggestion that any public policy question having a moral or ethical dimension is beyond the competency of the courts. Exactly how the line between public policy and morality is to be drawn is unclear, with Finkelstein J himself having implicitly conceded that the very nature of a public policy exception is, in some cases at least, synonymous with an exception based on ethics.215
In addition, whilst historically very few patented subject matter have raised ethical issues, this is rapidly changing with the biotechnological revolution of the last 20 years. This revolution has given rise to a range of new and developing subject matter that are seeking accommodation within traditional patents jurisprudence in exactly the same way as occurred with methods of medical treatment in the early 20th century. The difference in respect of such subject matter, however, is that the legal and ethical issues raised by their patenting is the subject of a wide-ranging public debate. Whilst much of this debate concerns the logic and morality of treating biotechnology as 'inventions' capable of monopolisation,216 it also raises questions regarding the rights of patients versus those of pharmaceutical companies which increasingly represent the primary source of ownership of patents for recombinant and other medicinal products.217 However the ethical issues concerning individual biotechnological subject matter are ultimately resolved, it is clear that if they are to be resolved judicially and on a case by case basis, the courts will first need to answer the question raised by Finkelstein J regarding the extent to which decision makers are competent to consider ethical issues when determining a particular subject matter's eligibility for patent protection. Interestingly, in casting doubt over such competency, Finkelstein J undermined the distinction drawn by Sheppard J in the Rescare appeal between the approaches of Australian and New Zealand judges to the medical methods question (as, indeed, did the other Full Court Judges in BristolMyers). According to Sheppard J, whilst the Judges of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the (then) leading case in that jurisdiction218 had felt bound or led by existing authority to conclude that medical methods were not patentable and had viewed any decision to the contrary as the responsibility of the legislature and not the courts, the Judges of the High Court of Australia in NRDC had 'regarded the matter as one which the Court was free to decide' -the reason it had not been conclusively decided in that case being that the matter had not been raised for decision.219
Whether the High Court of Australia will regard the inherent patentability of methods of medical treatment as one it is 'free to decide' when the issue next comes before it remains to be seen, although Justice Gummow's first instance decision in Rescare suggests that he, at least, is likely to do so. In the meantime, however, the Judges of the Full Federal Court in Bristol-Myers have each opted for the approach ascribed by Sheppard J to the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Wellcome, albeit with the opposite result. Thus Black CJ and Lehane J were led by existing authority to conclude that methods of medical treatment were patentable, and Finkelstein J renounced the competency of courts to decide to the contrary. Ultimately this approach is a further reflection of the historical unwillingness of Anglo-Australian decision makers to deal substantively with the relationship between inherent patentability and morality. In addition, however, it demonstrates that such unwillingness is not of itself conclusive of a particular result, the Federal Court having obtained the opposite result in Bristol-Myers to that obtained by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Wellcome, and the UK PAT in Eli Lilly and Upjohn, even though it adopted the same approach.
IV CONCLUSION
As has been noted, the existence of an exclusion from patentability in respect of methods of medical treatment has been the only consistent and reliable theme in the history of medical method patents in the UK to date. Whilst the same cannot be said of Australia (where such methods are now accepted to be inherently patentable), what can be said is that Australian judicial thinking has charted and continues to chart the same general course as judicial thinking in the UK. This is reflected not only in the shifting judicial perspectives regarding the public policy issues raised by medical method patents, but also in the changing views regarding the relevance of such issues to conceptions of inherent patentability per se. Hence the assumption by decision makers in both jurisdictions until the 1970s that any exclusion from patentability in respect of medical methods could only be justified by reference to their failure to possess the essential tangible characteristics of an invention. Hence also the (continued) instability of the medical methods exclusion following its reconception in ethical terms after the 1970s, caused in the UK by the unwillingness of decision makers to consider ethical issues and (more recently) in Australia by the same emerging unwillingness. The exclusion's entrenchment by Parliament has not stabilised it in the UK, even though such entrenchment relies on grounds other than inherent patentability and public policy. Perhaps ironically however, particularly given the general lack of support for a medical methods exclusion amongst contemporary decision makers, courts in the UK have resisted the recent trend in Europe of supporting clever drafting techniques aimed at allowing such methods to be patented. Whether the legislature will enter the fray in Australia remains to be seen. If it does, it will be interesting to see how Australian judges interpret any future legislative exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patentability.
The overall conclusion to be drawn from the history of medical methods in Australian and UK law is that the rudderless nature of decision makers' responses to medical method patents has been to the detriment of 20th century patents law in its precipitation of at best unclear, and at worst unconvincing, legal principles. Whilst historically the main focus of such principles has been inherent patentability, and the role therein of morality and other public policy considerations, the secondary requirement of novelty has also more recently been implicated in the UK. Inevitably such principles have had -and in Australia particularly look set to continue to have -implications for a wide range of subject matter beyond methods of medical treatment.
